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TERRORISM PLENARY MEETING REPORT, PART 3 OF 3

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Classified By: Political Economic Counselor Drew Mann for reasons 1.4,
b and d.

START PART THREE OF THREE

BILATERAL MEETING WITH THE NETHERLANDS

¶32. (SBU) AA/S Kang met with Robert de Groot at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Monday, June 15, 2009. De Groot, Deputy Director for Political Affairs, began the meeting by describing one of the recent lessons that the Dutch had arrived at from the recent Gaza Counter Arms Smuggling Initiative meeting in Ottawa. The Dutch had concluded that government institutions, other than the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs (such as intelligence and law enforcement agencies) can do a lot to promote international objectives. This applies to both the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Initiative. The Global Initiative is an excellent opportunity for Ministries to reach out to other home agencies in a way they have not done in the past and to cooperate in various activities. It is important for GICNT countries to use those agencies. The Dutch also noted that it is a challenge to figure out how to proceed in all these initiatives without creating something too large and bureaucratic.

¶33. (SBU) AA/S Kang noted that the United States has some ideas on how to strengthen the implementation of the Global Initiative to make it a durable international institution, and that the United States is interested in Dutch views. AA/S Kang said that the United States appreciates the flexibility of the GICNT and is not interested in creating a secretariat with bricks and mortar. In addition, the new administration is seeking to increase engagement by GICNT partners, while reducing the U.S. footprint.

¶34. (SBU) De Groot stated that the Dutch Government is not sure that they want the United States to step back too much from leadership of the GICNT. He said that the United States is the only country that can really afford to send people to multiple simultaneous meetings. He did add that the Dutch Government would be interested in coordinating on the Global Initiative agenda and on the working groups. He also added that it would be difficult to use the United Nations as an umbrella for the GICNT, given the difficulty of negotiating agreements in a UN forum. However, it would be possible to take advantage of various UN resolutions. De Groot emphasized that some form of enhancement is needed now that the GICNT had grown so large to ensure that it retained its focus. It is important to prevent the GICNT from taking on too broad an agenda.

¶35. (SBU) AA/S Kang agreed that we want to keep the focus of the GICNT narrow. In addition, we need to think about how

the Initiative can take advantage of the nuclear security summit that President Obama announced during his April 5 speech in Prague.

Netherlands on European Security

¶36. (SBU) De Groot noted that there are a number of European security issues coming up. The first is the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) meetings in Corfu, Greece. Russian President Medvedev clearly has a vision of European Security. The challenge for the European nations will be to find a common European Union position--as well as a common NATO position--for the upcoming meetings. De Groot also said that he believes that the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty will be resolved once other issues such as the follow-on to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) are resolved.

Netherlands on Iran Q Netherlands on Iran

¶37. (SBU) De Groot asked AA/S Kang for an update on where the United States is on our discussions with Iran and whether there is a timeline for this engagement. AA/S Kang responded that there is no real timeline, though we would not be willing to continue indefinitely without a response. AA/S Kang echoed President Obama's statement that the United States will likely have a better picture of where the negotiations stood by the end of the year. In the meantime, the United States will continue its dual-track policy of implementing sanctions against Iranian government entities, such as the shipping industry, and seeking diplomatic engagement with Iran.

¶38. (C) De Groot stated his belief that the Iranians are on a very clear path and have made a strategic decision, based on regional considerations, not to halt their nuclear efforts. Moreover, he said it was not clear to him what Iran would want out of a negotiation. The only question is what the rest of the world could do to stop these programs. As a result, the Dutch MFA strongly supports imposing more sanctions on Iran. However, the MFA is receiving pushback from the Ministry of Finance. Some Dutch officials believe that every time the EU imposes a new sanction, the Dutch financial sector is hurt, while the interests of other EU nation are not. He also affirmed that the Dutch Government believes that the actions the United States is taking to engage the other countries in the region and increase their confidence is the right response.

Netherlands on Missile Defense

¶39. (C) De Groot also brought up missile defense and advised that in September there is to be a Nimble Titan exercise in Amsterdam. The focus of the exercise will be on the political aspects of missile defense, not the usual military aspect of deploying and using missile defense systems. He noted that he would be very pleased if a State Department official could attend, as well. AA/S Kang responded that his bureau is very much involved in missile defense issues and also in the Nimble Titan series of exercises.

BILATERAL MEETING WITH RUSSIA

¶40. (SBU) AA/S Kang met with Russian Ambassador Safonov, Special Presidential Representative for International Cooperation in the Fight Against Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime. Amb. Safonov began the discussion by noting how far U.S. and Russian relations have come over the past several years. He stated that the United States and Russia have not always been able to do everything they wanted, but our two countries should not underestimate what we have achieved. AA/S Kang explained to Amb. Safonov the U.S. proposals for strengthening the Global Initiative to make it an enduring international institution. He said that the United States values the flexibility and adaptability of the

Initiative and still values U.S. and Russian leadership. AA/S Kang stated that preventing nuclear terrorism is important for both the U.S. and Russian presidents. He hoped that our two governments could make good progress at the Plenary meeting, that we would hear good ideas from others, and that we could move forward on enhancing implementation.

¶41. (SBU) Amb. Safonov responded that nuclear materials security should be the focus of the two presidents when they meet in July. The meeting should cover not just the history or recent past of this issue but the cooperation that has been achieved, such as the Global Initiative, where the United States and Russia have pushed and pulled together to get the initiative running. Amb. Safonov observed that at its initial stages, the Global Initiative was flexible and soft. This worked and, as a result, the number of countries that are participants has grown. This showed that the GICNT was interesting to many countries. He agreed with AA/S Kang that the initiative needed to move forward. He urged that we ensure our progress is matched with a careful assessment of (1) the technology and how to protect that, and (2) the plans and schemes of potential enemies. Amb. Safonov also referred to President Obama's statement regarding strengthening the Global Initiative and said that Russia agreed; the details of the Global Initiative and said that Russia agreed; the details could be finalized at the working level. He noted that we have completed the very important first stage of the GICNT, which consisted of getting it up and running. As we move into this second stage, we must work carefully to bring good, reliable ideas. Amb. Safonov said that he believed the GICNT is maturing and that we should invite all GICNT countries to work on enhancing implementation. These changes should be relevant, have an impact, and steer clear from duplication. He also cautioned that we must be careful not to scare countries away, because the threat is real. He noted that Russia looked forward to promoting the GICNT with the United States.

¶42. (C) AA/S Kang then observed that with the increase in reliance upon nuclear energy around the world, the U.S. and Russia need to take into account the security issues that come along with that capability. Amb. Safonov responded that relevant technology exists that should be shared. In that respect, Amb. Safonov added that there was real concern among his colleagues about the risks in Pakistan. He asked what can we do if the Taliban take over that country. He said that Russia felt it needed to find out the real threat and address it.

Kosovo and GICNT

¶43. (C) Prior to the Kang-Safonov meeting, U.S. and Russian delegations met at the staff level to review the substance and logistics of the Plenary. During this meeting, Rozhkov noted emphatically that while Kosovo had provided a letter of endorsement of GICNT Principles to the United States, the Russians, as Co-Chair, objected. He urged the U.S. delegation not to raise Kosovo with Safonov, and explained that he had worked to persuade his leadership not to overreact by recruiting those whom the United States would reject. Rozhkov's bottom line to his seniors: The GICNT is not a political forum; we should handle these sensitive topics in other areas and let the GICNT be what it is. The U.S. delegation took the message on board and AA/S Kang did not raise the issue.

WINS and GICNT

¶44. (U) Separately but in the same meeting, Rozhkov said that the Russians support the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) and noted that WINS might be a source of good organizational support for GICNT.

BILATERAL PULL-ASIDE WITH FRANCE

¶45. (U) In a pull-aside with Thomas Guibert, Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AA/S Kang described President Obama,s call to make the GICNT a durable international institution, and said that the USG was still working with the Russian Co-Chair on how to do so. He solicited French input and requested their support to move in this direction. AA/S Kang also mentioned the USG,s interest in continuing to conduct outreach in various fora and regionally. Guibert noted GOF,s desire for progress on nuclear forensics and said France would like to host a forensics event in or about in January 2010.

BILATERAL MEETING WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM

¶46. (SBU) AA/S Kang met with Liane Saunders, Head of the Counterproliferation United Kingdom,s Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. AA/S Kang began the discussions by noting President Obama,s call to make the GICNT an &enduring international institution8 and discussed some of the United States, plans for achieving those goals. Saunders related that the UK believes that the GICNT is a good practical group and that we should not seek to turn it into a &talking shop.8 The group needs to be operational. Saunders added that the group draws in unique partners into the Counterproliferation area that normal do not work on that issue. The GICNT also needs to work to draw in more countries and develop more capacity. Saunders also stated that the current format of Plenary Meetings is difficult for many of the newer partner nations. There is a level of information saturation from all of the presentations. Instead, some of the presentations could be carved off. Instead, the Plenary Meeting should be a forum for decision making. That would bring more dynamism to the Initiative without bringing the bureaucracy.

¶47. (SBU) Sanders also raised the issue of whether there should be a mechanism in the GICNT to evaluate partner capacity. She observed that this is obviously a very sensitive subject. There might be a way to develop standards that were acceptable to all countries if you get the right balance in a steering group that develops those standards. You want to avoid a pass/fail type system and instead provide countries with basic standards that will help them address certain risk situations. Exercises are also an excellent way of telling how countries are doing. You can create standards Qof telling how countries are doing. You can create standards for exercises which would allow you to disguise the fact that you are judging a country,s performance. AA/S Kang concurred that this would be particularly useful for targeting some of the newer partners that had less experience in these areas. Saunders agreed that some prioritization would be useful. She also cautioned that you do not want to make an unrealistic hurdle.

¶48. (SBU) Coordinator Watt briefed Saunders on the U.S. incentive program, which would provide countries with assistance in developing roadmaps for a certain Global Initiative function area. She noted that while the United States would pay for this assistance, the recipient would be required to put the assistance to practical use by conducting a GICNT exercise. Saunders noted that the UK is looking at E

prioritizing nuclear security funds. She agreed that countries are looking at where they can get money to help them implement these security issues. The UK has some money uncommitted and is working on a list of priority countries.

UK on Enrichment and Reprocessing

¶49. (C) Saunders and AA/S Kang also discussed the results of the recently concluded Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting. On the issue of Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR), Saunders stated that she believes the Turkish Ambassador does not understand the issue and has weak technical support. It is

also unclear whether this is driven from Ankara or if the Ambassador is operating beyond his instructions. Saunders believes that Turkey could be brought around with the change in language on instability. Saunders believes it is important to go back and work on Turkey. Saunders also noted the challenge of getting South Africa to agree to the ENR provisions. She noted that UK Prime Minister Brown wants to find ways where the UK can add value on nuclear issues. He is contemplating using his relationship with South African President Zuma to raise this issue. However, that will likely have to wait until the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General's race is concluded. She closed by noting that the U.S. and UK should work closely on this issue.

BILATERAL MEETING WITH SPAIN

¶50. (SBU) AA/S Kang met with Spanish Secretary of State Llossada on June 16. Llossada sought to discuss the issue of Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR), which was discussed at the recently completed Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting. According to Llossada, Spain recognizes that there are countries that should not be allowed to have ENR capabilities. Spain particularly noted that there are countries close to its borders that it would not want to see with these capabilities. However, Spain objected to being lumped into the same category as these other States. While they did not have immediate ENR plans, given their level of technological development, they could foresee a point in the future where they might want to develop ENR capabilities. However, if they agree to the language in the U.S. ENR proposal, they would be restricted to receiving black box technology. AA/S Kang observed that the U.S. was in a similar situation, but he believes that this is the best means of achieving consensus on this issue and putting in place conditions on these transfers.

¶51. (C) AA/S Kang and Llossada also discussed the current race for the IAEA Director General position. Llossada noted that Spain put Echavarri into the race in the hopes that he could be a potential consensus candidate and avoid a deadlock. Instead, the race was again deadlocked, which was causing polarization among Board of Governor (BOG) members. The polarization, Llossada observed, could cause problems in the future. AA/S Kang said the United States strongly supports Japanese candidate Amano, adding the U.S. view that Amano had the strongest nonproliferation credentials among the potential candidates and that he was only a few votes shy of the two-thirds majority necessary. AA/S Kang advised that the United States was planning a strong campaign on behalf of Amano in order to secure the few remaining votes that would put Amano over the top.

¶52. (U) The U.S. senior delegation has cleared this cable. This cable was cleared by U.S. Acting Assistant Secretary (AA/S) Eliot Kang.

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